STATEMENT OF

JACK DAVID

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
NEGOTIATIONS POLICY

BEFORE THE HOUSE HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS

JUNE 22, 2006

Chairman Linder, Congressman Langevin, Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear today to describe the current status and recent developments in the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, with particular attention to security of fissile materials and biological weapons proliferation prevention. The portions of the CTR program related to these issues are important in and of themselves. However, they also fit within an important broader context of DoD's efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In order to illuminate the broader context for the subcommittee, I will use my prepared statement to describe the full range of DoD's efforts to combat the proliferation of WMD and our plans to implement recommendations outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) regarding WMD.

The missions of preventing proliferation of WMD, preventing the use of WMD and enabling our warfighters to continue operations in a WMD environment are not new. Since December 2002, when the President set forth the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Department has taken a number of measures to enable us better to implement the Strategy. At the same time, while adapting at the strategic level, we have been carrying out the day-to-day activities – some ongoing, some new, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) – to implement policies dictated by the Strategy.

Strategic Guidance

At the strategic level, preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD is one of the four priorities the Department identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review just issued by Secretary Rumsfeld on February 6, 2006. This is the first QDR that has devoted such attention to the threat of WMD. Also at the strategic level, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Peter Pace issued the first-ever National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction on February 13, 2006. Secretary Rumsfeld also endorsed the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD. The strategic approach of the QDR and of the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD is built on the "three pillars" of combating WMD identified in the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD: nonproliferation, counterproliferation and consequence management. We define these terms as follows:

- Nonproliferation - Actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.
- Counterproliferation - Actions to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, U.S. Armed Forces, its allies, and partners.
- WMD Consequence Management - Actions taken to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack, or event, and to restore essential operations and services at home and abroad.

The National Military Strategy to Combat WMD identifies eight military mission areas that support the pillars in the National Strategy: offensive operations, elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, WMD consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation.

This strategic framework is the Department's way of dividing the broad "combating WMD" mission into specific, definable, manageable activities. By dividing the mission in this way, we can address it with greater focus in the budget, training, doctrine and policy processes.

Organizing for the Combating WMD Mission

In addition to better defining the strategic framework to address WMD, the Department of Defense has transformed its organizational structure to better combat WMD. On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Defense designated the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as the Department's lead for synchronizing and integrating combating WMD operational efforts in support of our Combatant Commanders. In this new role, STRATCOM supports other Combatant Commanders as they execute combating WMD operations. On January 31, 2006, the Secretary of Defense gave the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) an additional duty by appointing him Director of STRATCOM's Combating WMD Center (SCC). This appointment was recommended by the QDR. It is intended to enhance STRATCOM's ability to synchronize and integrate the Department's combating WMD operational efforts. STRATCOM, through the SCC, is charged with identifying combating WMD requirements and advocating for them throughout the budget process. Secretary Rumsfeld, in his January 6, 2005 letter designating STRATCOM as the DoD lead for synchronizing and integrating DoD's combating WMD efforts, specifically directed STRATCOM to address WMD elimination and interdiction as its first two missions and, in regard to each, to substantially increase our capabilities.

Complementing the WMD assignment to STRATCOM, all DoD components have been directed to realign themselves to improve execution of the combating WMD mission. Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, for example, my own office realigned to create a near-single point of contact for policy support of the combating WMD mission. My office is now responsible for six of eight mission areas identified in the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD: elimination operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense, security cooperation and partner activities and threat reduction cooperation. My sister office, Forces Policy, is responsible for the "offensive operations" mission area. The Policy Organization's oversight of the "consequence management" mission is still being addressed.

The goal of DoD's recent elaborations of strategy and rearrangement of components is summed up by quoting the following words from President Bush's January 20, 2004, State of the Union address: "America is committed to keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous regimes." To fulfill this commitment, the QDR directs that "national efforts to counter the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction must incorporate both preventive and responsive dimensions." Preventive activities include those that: build and expand global partnerships aimed at preventing proliferation; stop WMD-related trafficking; help friendly governments improve controls over existing WMD; and discredit WMD as an instrument of national power. When preventive activities fail, DoD must be prepared to respond. DoD must be prepared to locate, secure and destroy WMD.

Preventive Dimension of Combating WMD

The Toolkit for Preventive Activities

With respect to the preventive dimension, we have long viewed nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes as integral elements of our strategy for combating WMD. These treaties and regimes include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime. DoD brings significant policy and technical expertise to bear on enforcement of these regimes through my office, Combating WMD & Negotiations Policy and through the Defense Technology Security Administration.

Interdiction

While these regimes are important to preventing proliferation of WMD, not all countries are members of all regimes and many countries that are members cheat. WMD-related programs of countries like Iran and North Korea show the importance of additional measures such as interdiction. Interdiction is an essential component of our effort to prevent proliferation activities of both suppliers and customers. The threat of interdiction increases the costs for proliferators. It may even deter some suppliers from getting into the business of proliferation. DoD is taking steps to strengthen U.S. military capabilities to support interdiction. In October 2005, the Naval War College organized the first government-wide, classified gaming exercise for all U.S. agencies involved in interdiction. The U.S. Navy has improved shipboarding and cargo assessment by validating its new Visit Board Search and Seizure team capability. The Defense Intelligence Agency has established a new division for interdiction support to DoD policy makers. These steps and others being taken will give us an ever-improving interdiction capability.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Since President Bush launched the PSI in May 2003, we have worked more closely with other governments on interdiction. The PSI has encouraged the United States and other countries to collaborate to interdict WMD-related shipments bound to and from states of

concern. It also has encouraged and enabled them to improve national capabilities supporting interdiction of WMD-related shipments. As a result, like-minded nations are developing a more robust arsenal of WMD interdiction tools.

PSI participants define interdiction broadly to include military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to impede and stop proliferation-related shipments. The PSI concerns shipments by sea, air or land, as well as trans-modal shipments. Today more than 75 countries from all regions of the world have indicated support for the PSI. We continue to discuss the initiative with key states in the areas where proliferators may operate.

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)

Mr. Chairman, Congress already is familiar with the history and details of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, through my office, provides policy guidance and oversight for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency implements that guidance.

The CTR program supports two of the mission areas identified by the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD: threat reduction cooperation and security cooperation/partner activities. The program continues to help eliminate WMD material and enhance security for permissible stocks of WMD, particularly WMD left over in the former Soviet Union. As the subcommittee requested, I will focus my testimony on recent developments in CTR, as well as on priorities for the year ahead. I also will highlight the nuclear security and biodefense areas in which the subcommittee has expressed interest.

DoD has accomplished a great deal by means of the CTR program in fiscal years 2005 and 2006-to-date. In this timeframe, CTR continued its WMD infrastructure elimination work in Russia: CTR projects destroyed 42 intercontinental missiles and continued work to destroy SS-24/25 mobile missiles as well as their rail- or road-mobile launchers. CTR has also continued work on the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch'ye. The Shchuch'ye facility will provide Russia a capability to eliminate some 2.1 million artillery shells and rockets loaded with nerve agent. The shells and rockets to be destroyed are very proliferable as they easily can be transported. At Shchuch'ye, both the Russian-built and CTR-built main chemical weapons elimination buildings stand near completion. They are ready to be outfitted internally with chemical handling and neutralization equipment.

Also in Russia, CTR has continued its assistance to improve the security of nuclear warheads in storage. With the President's Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative of February 2005, we accelerated work that was already under way through CTR and a related Department of Energy program. This work was not programmed for completion before 2011. We now are poised to complete our security work at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites by 2008.

What was achieved at Bratislava was Russian agreement to supply information promptly on all warhead sites where Moscow viewed U.S. assistance to be necessary. Russia met that commitment by providing detailed information in June 2005, which allowed U.S. agencies and

the Russian government to agree on an accelerated schedule to upgrade security at select sites by 2008.

Let me be clear: the U.S. is not enhancing security of warheads attached to operational nuclear delivery systems; rather, we are supporting Russia in its responsibility to secure its extensive warhead inventory across its vast and often remote array of storage facilities. The U.S. will be able to say by 2008 that we have done all we can to bring security of Russia's nuclear weapons up to credible standards. That will be a significant achievement. We needed Congressional help with this endeavor, and Congress delivered: the accelerated schedule required an additional $44.5 million in Fiscal Year 2006 funds, which were included in the recently enacted Supplemental Appropriations measure. We appreciate this support very much and look forward to keeping Congress updated on the progress we make implementing the Bratislava Initiative.

DoD implementation of CTR programs in the past year also has addressed the threat of biological weapons. The CTR "Threat Agent Detection and Response" (TADR) project addresses the threat of loose dangerous pathogens in former Soviet Union countries at the same time as it strengthens our ability to deal with these pathogens should they come from another source.

TADR is being implemented in Central Asian and Caucasus states. It is a web-based disease surveillance network that replaces the Soviet system of maintaining libraries of dangerous pathogens in unsecured locations. In the TADR program, we consolidate dangerous pathogen strains currently dispersed at numerous locations within a country in to a few central locations. We help to construct Central Reference Laboratories typically in the capital cities of partner countries. These are designed to have the ability to characterize and securely store collected samples of dangerous pathogens. A very important feature of the TADR program is that the U.S. receives samples of each of the collected pathogen strains. This will better enable us to determine whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or a potential bio-terror event.

In 2005, we signed agreements on TADR assistance with Azerbaijan and with Ukraine. These TADR program agreements follow others already in place with Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The TADR project has been a key initiative for this Administration. We believe it helps meet a significant, unfilled requirement for the U.S. to stay abreast of and combat the global bio-terror threat. TADR-supplied equipment and training already in place have been used to identify Avian Influenza.

During the past year, DoD also made advances in combating WMD as a result of its CTR WMD border security project. This project is known as the WMD-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI). The PPI was conceived early in the present Administration and influenced heavily by the September 11 attacks. DoD took the CTR program in a fundamentally new direction when it introduced PPI. Before PPI was introduced, the CTR program dealt with WMD only at its source.

9/11 highlighted the need to address the threat of "WMD-on-the-move." PPI focuses on countries that are willing to try to stop WMD on the move but lack resources to do so. In initiating PPI, DoD expanded the CTR program from simply helping countries to destroy WMD

and related items *in place* to helping countries to build detection/interdiction capabilities. PPI is now working in Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. We recently expanded activities in Ukraine, and signed key legal agreements with Kazakhstan to allow us to begin PPI projects with that country as well. We are focusing on Central Asian countries because of their proximity to Russia in order to create a WMD "safety net." As successful as we hope the CTR PPI projects are, DoD is not limiting these combating WMD projects to merely supplying equipment through PPI. We are working with the Combatant Commands to provide training, doctrine and tactics for the equipment we help bring to CTR PPI partners.

Finally, I can report that in May 2005, DoD took the initiative to extend the CTR program's legal framework with Russia – over one-year ahead of expiration. We took this step to avoid a disruption of CTR's important work such as occurred seven years ago, the last time the framework required extension. We are pleased to report that the extension protocol was finally signed on June 17, with acceptable terms for the U.S. This will allow CTR's important work to secure and eliminate WMD and related infrastructure in Russia to continue uninterrupted.

International Counterproliferation Program (ICP)

Mr. Chairman, I want to take a moment to describe DoD's International Counterproliferation Program, which is a small but important element of our "toolkit" for combating proliferation of WMD, particularly radiological material. As in the case of the CTR program, the ICP program is implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Also like the CTR program, policy matters for ICP are handled by my office. The March 2006 transfer of ICP from its previous home in the Eurasia regional office to be in my office is another example of how we are consolidating and aligning DoD policy responsibilities related to combating WMD.

The ICP attempts to build capabilities to secure borders of participating nations against illicit trafficking among partner nations. The ICP works with the US Customs and Border Protection Service, the FBI, and other U.S. agencies to provide training that is focused specifically at the law enforcement and regulatory level. It is intended to make proliferation of WMD across borders much more difficult. At first glance, the ICP looks a lot like the new CTR border security initiative I described above. However, there are key differences in programmatics, authorities, and policy objectives.

Programmatically, the ICP has always been a "niche" activity, with funding at $12-$15 million annually. The ICP also has not provided participating countries with heavy infrastructure or extensive procurement, as CTR often has and does. The ICP's authorities are also more geographically flexible than those of CTR: with approval of the Secretary of Defense, the ICP can be implemented in any country in the world. As you know, absent Presidential approval to work elsewhere, the CTR program may be implemented only in countries of the Former Soviet Union. In addition, the ICP has regional objectives not present with CTR. ICP training sessions and other activities are conducted, to the extent possible, on a multilateral basis in order that partner countries can be encouraged to think about WMD border security as a regional challenge, not merely a national one.

ICP is still new to my office and we are conducting a top-to-bottom review and revalidation of past practices. We will ensure that ICP activities are supportive of national strategies, coordinated with other agencies' activities, and leveraged with other programs to achieve the best results possible.

Responsive Dimension of Combating WMD

Investing for the Future

Developing our strategies, restructuring our organizations and changing our daily activities will be of no avail without adequate funding for corresponding capabilities, technologies and mission areas. The autumn 2005 program/budget review undertook a comprehensive analysis of combating WMD funding. This analytical process was carried through the QDR. Beginning with the FY2006 budget submission, we added $2 billion to the previous $7.6 billion Fiscal Year 2006-2011 allocation for the Chemical Biological Defense Program and related infrastructure (an increase of almost 20%). The increase in chem-bio defense funding represents a down payment toward elevating the policy and programmatic attention we must give this area.

Joint Task Force for Elimination

One of the earliest lessons learned from our military operations in Iraq was that DoD needed a well organized, well trained force to be able to quickly and systematically locate, seize, secure, disable and safeguard an adversary's WMD program, including sites, laboratories, materials, and associated scientists and other personnel.

The Army's 20th Support Command, located north of Baltimore at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, was stood up as an Army headquarters. It is tasked to provide technically qualified chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield Explosives (CBRNE) response forces to support geographic Combatant Commanders. This unique organization includes the Army's Technical Escort Battalions as well as an Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group. While the 20th was not established until after Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of its units participated in the search for WMD in Iraq.

The 20th Headquarters was activated in 2004. However, while the military units assigned to this headquarters are deployable, the headquarters itself cannot deploy today since nearly two-thirds of the staff is composed of government civilians or contractors. In the QDR process, DoD leadership approved a proposal to assign 20th Support Command the task of becoming a deployable headquarters that could command and control these types of operations. Establishing a joint task force for elimination is a key element of the Department's vision, as articulated by the QDR, to deal with all aspects of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. The 20th gives us a base on which to build.

Biodefense Initiative

Another key conclusion of the QDR was that the Department should focus on new defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued evolution of WMD threats. In response, DoD has decided to reallocate funding within the Chem-Bio Defense program to invest over $1.5B over the next five years to develop broad-spectrum countermeasures against advanced biological threats. Rather than continuing the traditional approach to developing countermeasures – which in effect results in "one drug, one bug" -- DoD will conduct research to develop drugs that each can counter several pathogens. Another example is the research we will be conducting to develop a single pharmaceutical to counter all types of viral hemorrhagic fevers (like Ebola and Marburg). Another is the effort we will make to develop a single pharmaceutical for all "intracellular" pathogens, like Plague. In both cases, we will be leveraging molecular biotechnology cutting edge technologies currently available. These initiatives will support combating WMD efforts in general but will be of particular benefit to our forces that may well be ordered to deploy to places where these fevers pose a risk. Having one drug that can counter many bugs will improve military effectiveness by getting forces into the theater more quickly, protecting our forces more effectively and complicating an adversary's military calculus on the effect of his potential use of lethal pathogens against them.

Building Partner Capacity

More than ever before, we need partners be to be prepared for operations with us in a CBRN world. In 2002, the Department proposed creation of a CBRN Defense Battalion for NATO. This U.S. concept was endorsed by NATO defense ministers during the 2002 Prague Summit. Elements of a fully operational NATO CBRN Defense Battalion supported the 2004 Summer Olympics just over one year later. The NATO Battalion includes a CBRN joint assessment team and mobile chemical, biological and radiological laboratories; it has received personnel and capability support from seventeen NATO nations to date. The concept for the Battalion and the way it was quickly institutionalized were unprecedented at NATO. We continue to encourage strengthening of the Battalion's capabilities and also encourage member nations to improve their own combating WMD capabilities. The Battalion will be a model for future collaboration as we expand counterproliferation discussions with other nations.

We are aggressively pursuing the establishment of formal, regular bilateral discussions with international partners outside NATO on counterproliferation issues ranging from policy and operational support to detailed technical cooperation. We have or are establishing such bilateral working groups with countries from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia to respond to the use of WMD against us. Our partners in the working groups share our desire to prepare to defend against the WMD threat. A central goal of the bilateral working groups is to ensure that U.S. and potential coalition partners can execute combined operations in a WMD environment.

The challenge of interoperability is significant in a conventional warfighting environment. The challenge in a WMD situation is even greater as it raises many complicating issues. For example, if our combat or transport aircraft are returning from an area where WMD has been employed, we need to know in advance what decontamination our allies will require in order to ensure ready access to important way stations and forward depots. Similar problems relate to the decontamination of forces – including potentially wounded personnel – who will require immediate evacuation and attention. We have launched discussions with our NATO

allies as well with several key potential coalition partners on these and other issues we believe need to be resolved for combined operations in a WMD environment.

Building partner capacity takes many forms and can include building legal capacities. In 2005, Navy, Joint Staff, General Counsel and OSD-Policy representatives completed three years of activity to expand legal authorities against maritime trafficking in WMD-related materials. We helped secure adoption of amendments to the Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, establishing the first international standard for criminalizing maritime activities related to WMD as well as a comprehensive boarding regime for WMD-related maritime shipments. Once the Amendment enters into force, after ratification by 12 member-states, we will have a new law to prosecute violators and press for greater vigilance against trafficking in WMD.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, DoD understands that combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction requires thoughtful planning, adaptability to changing circumstances and unwavering determination. These, we believe, are reflected in our new strategic guidance, realigned organizational structure, and in changes we are making to our day-to-day activities. Our commitment to success in this endeavor is absolute. Failure is not an option. Congress is an essential partner in this fight, and we look forward to continuing our work together. Thank you again for inviting me to testify.